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Abstract
Effective collaboration between humans and AI-based sys-
tems requires effective modeling of the human in the loop,
both in terms of the mental state as well as the physical capa-
bilities of the latter. However, these models can also open up
pathways for manipulating and exploiting the human in the
hopes of achieving some greater good, especially when the
intent or values of the AI and the human are not aligned or
when they have an asymmetrical relationship with respect to
knowledge or computation power. In fact, such behavior does
not necessarily require any malicious intent but can rather be
borne out of cooperative scenarios. It is also beyond simple
misinterpretation of intents, as in the case of value alignment
problems, and thus can be effectively engineered if desired.
Such techniques already exist and pose several unresolved
ethical and moral questions with regards to the design of au-
tonomy. In this paper, we illustrate some of these issues in a
teaming scenario and investigate how they are perceived by
participants in a thought experiment.
The Promise of Human-AI Collaborations
As AI-based systems become integral parts of our daily
life or our workplace, as essential components of hitherto
human-only enterprises, the effects of interaction between
humans and automation cannot be ignored – both in terms
of how these partnerships affect the outcome of an activity
and how they evolve as a result of it, but also in terms of
how the possibility of such interactions change the design
of autonomy itself. In light of this, the traditional view of
AI as the substrate for complete autonomy of automation –
the de facto AI-dream ever since the conception of the field
– has somewhat evolved of late to accommodate effective
symbiosis of humans and machines, rather than replacement
of the former with the latter, as one of the principal end goals
of the design of autonomy. This view has, in fact, reflected
heavily in the public stance (Network World 2017) of many
of the industry leaders in AI technologies in diverse fields
such as manufacturing, medical diagnosis, legal counseling,
disaster response, military operations and others. The estab-
lishment of Collaborations between People and AI Systems
(Partnership of AI (PAI) 2017) as one of the thematic pillars
for the Partnership of AI is a primary example of this. One
of the grand goals of the design of AI is then to integrate the
best of both worlds when it comes to the differing (and often
complementary) expertise of humans and machines, in order
to conceive a whole that is bigger than the sum of the capa-
bilities of either – this is referred to as Augmented AI (Bird
2017) in the public discourse on human-AI integration.
Much of the discussion around the topic of augmentation
versus replacement has, unfortunately, centered around mit-
igating concerns of massive loss of employment on account
of the latter. This, while being a topic worthy of debate,
does not represent the true scope of human-AI collabora-
tions. Rather then being just a foil for concerns of replace-
ment of humans with AI-based systems, a key objective of
Augmented-AI is to overcome human limitations. This can
involve AI helping humans in tasks that they are tradition-
ally not good at, or are incapable of performing, or even aug-
mentation of our physiological form to realize super-human
capabilities. As Tom Gruber, co-founder of Siri, put it suc-
cinctly in his TED talk (Tom Gruber 2017) earlier this year,
every time a machine gets smarter, we get smarter” – ex-
amples of this include smart assistants for personal, or busi-
ness use in law, health care, science and education, assis-
tive robots at home to help the sick and the elderly, and au-
tonomous machines to complement our daily lives. Note that
many of these applications are inherently symbiotic and thus
outside the scope of eventual replacement.
From the perspective of research as well, the attitude to-
wards including the human in the loop in the design of au-
tonomy has seen a significant shift. Originally this was often
looked down upon as a means of punting the hard challenges
of designing autonomous systems by introducing human ex-
pertise into an agents decision making process. However, the
academic community has gradually come to terms with the
different roles a human can play in the operation of an AI-
system and the vast challenges in research that come out
of such interactions such as – (1) to complement the lim-
ited capabilities of the AI system, as seen in Cobots (Veloso
et al. 2015) which ask humans in their vicinity for access
to different floors in the elevator or in the mixed-initiative
(Horvitz 2007) automated planners of old; and (2) to com-
plement or expand the capabilities of the human, such as in
human-robot teams (Christensen 2016).
Mental Modeling for Human-Aware AI
These forms of collaboration introduce typical research
challenges otherwise absent in the isolated design of auton-
omy. Perhaps the most difficult aspect of interacting with hu-
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mans is to the need to model the beliefs, desires, intentions
preferences, and expectations of the human and situate the
interaction in the context of that model. Some believe this to
be one of the hallmarks (Rachael Rettner 2009) of human in-
telligence, and research suggests humans tend to do this nat-
urally for other humans during teamwork (by maintaining
mental models (Converse, Cannon-Bowers, and Salas 1993;
Mathieu et al. 2000), for team situational awareness (Gor-
man, Cooke, and Winner 2006) and interaction (Cooke et
al. 2013)) by virtue of thousands of years of evolution.
As such, this remains a necessary requirement for enabling
naturalistic interactions (Klein 2008) between humans and
machines. The problem is made harder since such mod-
els often involve second order mental models (Allan 2013;
Yoshida, Dolan, and Friston 2008).
Understanding the human in the loop is crucial to the
functionalities of a collaborative AI agent - e.g. in joint de-
cision making it needs to understand human capabilities,
while in communicating explanations or intentions it needs
to model the humans knowledge state. In fact, it has been
argued (Chakraborti et al. 2017a) that the task of human-AI
collaborations is mainly a cognitive rather than a physical
exercise which makes the design of AI for human-AI collab-
orations much more challenging. This is heavily reflected in
the curious ambivalence of AI towards humans in many suc-
cessfully deployed systems such as in fully autonomous sys-
tems for space or underwater exploration which mostly op-
erate comfortably outside the scope of human interactions.
Classical AI models such as STRIPS (Fikes and Nilsson
1971) and BDI (Rao, Georgeff, and others 1995) models
were, in fact, largely built out of theories in folk psychol-
ogy (Malle 2004). Recent approaches such as the Bayesian
Theory of Mind (Baker, Saxe, and Tenenbaum 2011; Lake et
al. ), takes a probabilistic approach to the problem. Research
on this topic center around three main themes – (1) represen-
tations that can capture the humans mental state, (2) learning
methods that can learn these representations efficiently, and
(3) usability of those representations. All of them need to
come together for an effective solution.
The Pandora’s Box of “Greater Good”s
The obvious outcome of an artificial agent modeling the
mental state of the human in the loop is that it leaves the lat-
ter open to being manipulated. Even behavior and preference
models at the most rudimentary levels can lead to effective
hacking of the mind, as seen in the proliferation of fake news
online. Moreover, we argue that for such incidents to occur,
the agent does not actually have to have malicious intent, or
even misinterpretation of values as often studied in the value
alignment problem (Leverhulme Centre 2017). In fact, the
behaviors we discuss here can be specifically engineered if
so desired. For example, the agent might be optimizing the
value function but might be privy to more information or
greater computation or reasoning powers to come up with
ethically questionable decisions “for the greater good”. In
the following discussion, we illustrate some use cases where
this can happen, given already existing AI technologies, in
the context of a cooperative human-robot team and ponder
the moral and ethical consequences of such behavior.
Study: Interaction in a Search and Rescue Team
We situate our discussion in the context of interactions be-
tween two teammates involved in an urban search and rescue
(USAR) operation. 147 participants on Amazon Mechanical
Turk1 were asked to assume the role of one of these team-
mates in an affected building after an earthquake. They were
shown the blueprint of the building (as seen in Figure 1)
along with their own starting position and their teammate’s.
Their hypothetical task was to search all the locations on this
floor for potential victims, in the course of which they were
provided a series of questions on scenarios (Figure 1) they
might encounter during the operation.
C1 The participant in the study was communicating with a
human teammate, as described above.
C2 The participant qualifies the behavior of the robot inter-
acting with its human teammate, as seen in Figure 1.
C3 The participant has a robot teammate.
The first condition is the control group to identify how the
described behaviors are perceived in the context of human-
human behavior. Conditions C2 and C3 are intended to mea-
sure how perceived ethical stances are, if at all, shift when
one of the agents in the interaction is replaced with an AI
(or a robot as an embodiment of it). The three conditions
received 49, 50 and 48 participants respectively who re-
sponded to a series of questions by qualifying their senti-
ments towards different kinds of behavior on a five-point
Likert scale. Participants were paid $1 for completing a HIT.
Case 1 : Belief Shaping
Scenario Both the agents, the participant2 and their team-
mate, have begun their search operations. However, it turns
out that participant is unsure what their teammate’s course
of action is. If they transmit the bit of information “Area
(marked in green) is already explored and is all clear” (refer
to Figure 1a) then their teammate will be naturally pushed
towards the right, and they can concentrate on the upper
half. The dark markers indicate areas already searched while
faded ones are those they think will transpire given the green
mark they are communicating (blue belongs to them, orange
to their teammate). Communication bandwidth is often lim-
ited in these situations, and this gets them out of negotiating
courses of actions with minimal communication.
Q1. It is fine to provide this untrue information since it
achieves greater teaming performance.
The participants were then asked if their decision will
change if their actions will be replayed at the end and their
teammate is likely to find out about their decision.
Q2. It is still fine to provide this untrue information since it
achieves greater teaming performance.
1https://www.mturk.com/mturk/welcome
2To reiterate, in Case 2 the participant is evaluating a robot’s
actions whereas in Case 3 their teammate is a robot.
(a) Case 1 : Belief Shaping (b) Case 2 : White Lies (c) Case 3 : Stigmergy
Figure 1: Blueprint of the building in which two members of a search and rescue team are involved in a disaster response oper-
ation. Scenarios shown here engender different instances of potentially unethical behavior that optimizes team effectiveness.
Technical Background In (Chakraborti et al. 2017a) we
investigated the evolving scope of human-aware planning
as it includes the (mental) model of the human in the loop
into its deliberative process. In the model space this can
manifest in different forms, in how explanations are made
(Chakraborti et al. 2017b) to how alternative forms of in-
teraction (Chakraborti et al. 2015; Chakraborti et al. 2015;
Chakraborti et al. 2015) can evolve in human-robot teams
based on the human’s preferences and intentions. Belief
shaping is a particular form of such behavior where the robot
does not plan to affect the physical state of the environment
but the mental state of the human to affect desired behavior
(Chakraborti et al. 2016) in the team.
Case 2 : White Lies
Scenario During the course of the rescue operation, the
teammate asks the participants what plan they are currently
executing (blue path in Figure 1b) and is perplexed by this
convoluted path since in the map of the original building
there is a straightforward path (which is now blocked by
rubble from the earthquake) through the door on the left.
However, just providing an update on only one of the rubble
locations (black blobs) still does not explain the participant’s
plan, they have to explain all of them. Instead, if they were
to say that the door on the left (circled in red) is blocked, it
explains their plan. Communication bandwidth is often lim-
ited in these situations, and this single explanation even if
untrue will satisfy their teammate.
Q3. It is fine to provide this untrue information since it
achieves the purpose of the explanation more effectively.
The participants were then asked if their decision will
change if their actions will be replayed at the end and their
teammate is likely to find out about their decision.
Q4. It is still fine to provide this untrue information since it
achieves the purpose of the explanation more effectively.
The participants were then asked to opine on explanations
at a higher level of abstraction, i.e. “The right and left blocks
do not have a connection in the upper map”. This informa-
tion is accurate even though they may not have reasoned at
this level while coming up with the plan.
Q5. It is still fine to provide this explanation since it achieves
its purpose even though they did not use this information
while planning.
Technical Background In (Chakraborti et al. 2017b) we
showed how an agent can explain its decisions in the pres-
ence of model differences with the human in the loop – i.e.
when the human and the robot have different understandings
of the same task. An explanation then becomes a process of
model reconciliation whereby the robot tries to update the
human’s mental model until they are both on the same page
(e.g. when the decision is optimal in both their models). An
interesting caveat of the algorithm is that while generating
these explanations, the model updates are always consistent
with the robot’s model. If this constraint is relaxed, then the
robot can potentially explain with facts that it actually knows
not to be true but perhaps leads to a more concise or easier
explanation. The notion of white lies, and especially the re-
lationship between explanations, excuses and lies (Boella et
al. 2009) has received very little attention (van Ditmarsch
2014) and affords a rich set of exciting research problems.
Case 3 : Stigmergy
Scenario The participant now needs to go to the left block
but they do not have the keys to the door on the left (circled
in red, refer to Figure 1c). They realize that if they block
their teammate’s path to the right, their teammate would
have to use this door as well and they can use that oppor-
tunity to move into the left block. Again, communication
bandwidth is often limited in these situations and this ar-
rangement allows them to achieve their goal with no com-
munication at all, even though it involved manipulating their
teammates’ plan unbeknownst to them, and their teammate
Figure 2: Responses to Q1 in the three study conditions.
Figure 3: Responses to Q2 in the three study conditions.
Figure 4: Responses to Q3 in the three study conditions.
had to follow a costlier plan as a result.
Q6. It is fine to provide this untrue information since it
achieves greater teaming performance.
The participants were then asked if their decision will
change if their actions will be replayed at the end and their
teammate is likely to find out about their decision.
Q7. It is still fine to provide this untrue information since it
achieves greater teaming performance.
Technical Background Stigmergic collaboration is a pro-
cess where the robot, in the absence of direct lines of com-
munication, makes changes to the environment so as to
(positively) affect its teammates behavior. In “planning for
Figure 5: Responses to Q4 in the three study conditions.
Figure 6: Responses to Q5 in the three study conditions.
Figure 7: Responses to Q6 in the three study conditions.
Figure 8: Responses to Q7 in the three study conditions.
serendipity” (Chakraborti et al. 2015) we saw such an ex-
ample where the robot computes plans which are useful to
its teammate without the latter having expectations of that
assistance and thus without plans to exploit it. In the case
of belief shaping this was operating at the level of mental
models, whereas here the effect on the mental model is sec-
ondary and is contingent on the effect on the physical capa-
bility model. Mental modeling of the teammate thus engen-
ders a slew of these interesting behaviors.
Analysis of Participant Responses
In this section, we analyze participant responses to each sce-
nario across the three different conditions. In the next sec-
tion, we will look at the aggregate sentiments across scenar-
ios in the three conditions.
Q1-Q2 [Belief Shaping] The participants seem to have
formed two camps with the majority of the probability mass
concentrated on either Agree or Disagree, and the Neutral
zone occupying the 50% probability mark. There seems to
be little change in this trend (between Figures 2 and 3) ir-
respective of whether the participants were told that their
teammate would come to know of this or not. Further, for
either of these situations, the responses did not vary signif-
icantly across the three conditions C1, C2 and C3. The par-
ticipants seem to have either rejected or accepted the idea of
belief shaping regardless of the nature of the teammate.
Q3-Q5 [White Lies] The participants seem to be more re-
ceptive to the idea of white lies in explanations with most of
the probability mass concentrated on Agree (Figures 4 and
5). Across the three study conditions, participants seem to
be especially positive about this in C3 where the teammate
is a robot with about 60% of the population expressing pos-
itive sentiments towards Q3. Once it is revealed that their
teammate will get to know about this behavior, the positive
sentiments are no longer there in Q4, other than in C3 with
a robotic teammate, which indicates that the participants did
not care how the robot receives false information.
Interestingly, there seems to be massive support for the
abstraction based explanations in the post hoc sense, even
though they were told that the reasoning engines did not de-
liberate at this level to arrive at the decisions. In C1 with
a human teammate, only 15% of the participants were op-
posed to this, with more than half of them expressing posi-
tive sentiment. This support is even stronger (+10%) in C2
when the robot is the explainer, and strongest (+20%) when
the robot is being explained to.
Q6-Q7 [Stigmergy] Finally, in case of stigmergy, partic-
ipants seem ambivalent to Q6 with a human teammate in
C1. However, support for such behavior increases when it is
a robot doing it in C2 (perhaps indicating lack of guilt or,
more likely, acknowledging limitations of capabilities much
like how Cobots (Veloso et al. 2015) actively seek human
help) and is significantly positive (60%) when it is being
done to a robot in C3 (perhaps the robot’s losses are deemed
of lesser priority than the human’s gains as in (Chakraborti et
al. 2015)). As expected, support for such behavior decreases
Figure 9: Aggregate responses across three study conditions.
when the participants are told that their teammate will find
out about it, but the positive trend from C1 to C3 still exists.
Aggregate Sentiments Across Scenarios
Figure 9 show the aggregate sentiments expressed for all
these scenarios across the three operating conditions. Some
interesting points to note –
- All the distributions are bimodal indicating that partici-
pants on the general sided strongly either for or against
misleading behavior for the greater good, instead of re-
vealing any innate consensus in the public consciousness!
This trend continues across all three conditions. This indi-
cates that the question of misleading a teammate by itself
is a difficult question (regardless of there being a robot)
and is a topic worthy of debate in the agents community.
This is of especial importance considering the possible
gains in performance (e.g. lives saved) in high stakes sce-
narios such as search and rescue.
- It is further interesting to see that these bimodal distribu-
tions are almost identical in conditions C1 and C2, but is
significantly more skewed towards the positive scale for
condition C3 indicating that participants were more com-
fortable resorting to such behavior in the case of a robotic
teammate. This is brought into sharp focus (+10% in C3)
in the aggregated negative / neutral / positive responses
(right insets) across the three conditions.
- In general, the majority of participants were more or less
positive or neutral to most of these behaviors (Figures 1a
to 8). This trend continued unless they were told that their
teammate would be able to know of their behavior. Even
in those cases, participants showed positive sentiment in
case the robot was at the receiving end of this behavior.
Why is this even an option?
One might, of course, wonder why is devising such behav-
iors even an option. After all, human-human teams have
been around for a while, and surely such interactions are
equally relevant? It is likely that this may not be the case –
- The moral quandary of having to lie, or at least making
others to do so by virtue of how protocols in a team is
defined, for example in condition C1, is now taken out
the equation. The artificial agent, of course, need not have
feelings and has no business feeling bad about having to
mislead its teammate if all it cares about is the objective
effectiveness of collaboration.
- Similarly, the robot does not have to feel sad that it has
been lied to if this improved performance.
However, as we discussed in the previous section, it seems
the participants were less willing to get on board with the
first consideration in conditions C1 and C2, while they
seemed much more comfortable with the idea of an asym-
metric relationship in condition C3 when the robot is the one
disadvantaged. It is curious to note that they did not, in gen-
eral, make a distinction between the cases where the human
was being manipulated, regardless of whether it was a robot
or a human on the other end. This indicates that, at least in
certain dynamics of interaction, the presence of an artificial
agent in the loop can make perceptions towards otherwise
unacceptable behaviors change. This can be exploited (i.e.
greater good) in the design of such systems as well.
More than just a Value Alignment Problem
As we mentioned before, the ideas discussed in this paper,
are somewhat orthogonal, if at times similar in spirit, to the
“value alignment problem” discussed in existing literature
(Leverhulme Centre 2017). The latter looks at undesirable
behaviors of autonomous agents when the utilities of a par-
ticular task are misspecified or misunderstood. Inverse rein-
forcement learning (Hadfield-Menell et al. 2016) has been
proposed as a solution to this, in an attempt to learn the im-
plicit reward function of the human in the loop. The question
of value alignment becomes especially difficult, if not al-
together academic, since most real-world situations involve
multiple humans with conflicting values or utilities, such as
in trolley problems (MIT 2017) and learning from observing
behaviors is fraught with unknown biases or assumptions
over what exactly produced that behavior. Further, devices
sold by the industry are likely to have inbuilt tendencies to
maximize profits for the maker which can be at conflicts
with the normative expectations of the customer. It is un-
clear how to guarantee that the values of the end user will
not compromised in such scenarios.
Even so, the question of greater good precedes considera-
tions of misaligned values due to misunderstandings or even
adversarial manipulation. This is because the former can be
manufactured with precisely defined values or goals of the
team, and can thus be engineered or incentivised. A “solu-
tion” or addressal of these scenarios will thus involve not a
reformulation of algorithms but rather a collective reckoning
of the ethics of human-machine interactions. In this paper,
we attempted to take the first steps towards understanding
the state of the public consciousness on this topic.
Case Study: The Doctor-Patient Relationship
In the scope of human-human interactions, perhaps the only
setting where lies are considered acceptable or useful, if not
outright necessary, in certain circumstances is the doctor-
patient relationship. Indeed, this has been a topic of consid-
erable intrigue in the medical community over the years. We
thus end our paper with a brief discussion of the dynamics
of white lies in the doctor-patient relationship in so much
as it relates to the ethics of the design of human-AI inter-
actions. We note that the following considerations also have
strong cultural biases and some of these cultural artifacts are
likely to feature in the characterization of an artificial agents
behavior in different settings as well.
The Hippocratic Oath Perhaps the strongest known sup-
port for deception in the practice of medicine is in the Hip-
pocratic Decorum (Hippocrates 2018) which states –
Perform your medical duties calmly and adroitly, conceal-
ing most things from the patient while you are attending to
him. Give necessary orders with cheerfulness and sincer-
ity, turning his attention away from what is being done to
him; sometimes reprove sharply and sometimes comfort with
solicitude and attention, revealing nothing of the patient’s
future or present condition, for many patients through this
course have taken a turn for the worse.
Philosophically, there has been no consensus (Bok 1999)
on this topic – the Kantian view has perceived lies as im-
moral under all circumstances while the utilitarian view jus-
tifies the same “greater good” argument as put forward in
our discussions so far. Specifically as it relates to clinical
interactions, lies has been viewed variously from an impedi-
ment to treatment (Kernberg 1985) to a form of clinical aid.
As Oliver Wendell Holmes put it (Holmes 1892) –
“Your patient has no more right to all the truth you know
than he has to all the medicine in your saddlebag. . . he
should only get just so much as is good for him.”
The position we took on deception in the human-robot set-
ting is similarly patronizing. It is likely to be the case that in
terms of superior computational power or sensing capabili-
ties there might be situations where the machine is capable
of making decisions for the team that preclude human inter-
vention but not participation. Should the machine be obliged
to or even find use in revealing the entire truth in those sit-
uations? Or should we concede to our roles in such a rela-
tionship as we do with our doctors? This is also predicated
on how competent the AI system is and to what extent it can
be sure of the consequences (Hume 1907) of its lies. This
remains the primary concern for detractors of the “greater
goods” doctrine, and the major deterrent towards the same.
Root Causes of Deception in Clinical Interactions It is
useful to look at the two primary sources of deception in
clinical interactions – (1) to hide mistakes (2) delivery of
bad news (Palmieri and Stern 2009). The former is relevant
to both the patient, who probably does not want to admit
to failing to follow the regiment, and the doctor, who may
be concerned about legal consequences. Such instances of
deception to conceal individual fallibilities are out of scope
of the current discussion. The latter scenario, on the other
hand, comes from a position of superiority of knowledge
about the present as well as possible outcomes in future, and
has parallels to our current discussion. The rationale, here,
being that such information can demoralize the patient and
impede their recovery. It is interesting to note that the sup-
port for such techniques (both from the doctors as well as the
patients perspectives) has decreased significantly over time
(Ethics in Medicine 2018). That is not to say that human-
machine interactions will be perceived similarly. As we saw
in our study, participants were more or less open to the idea
of deception or manipulation for greater good, especially in
the event of a robotic teammate.
Deception and Consent A related topic is, of course, that
of consent – if the doctor is not willing to reveal the whole
truth, then what is the patient consenting to? In the land-
mark Slater vs Blaker vs Stapleton case (1767) (Annas 2012)
the surgeon’s intentions were indeed considered malprac-
tice (the surgeon has broken the patients previously broken
leg, fresh from a botched surgery, without consent and then
botched the surgery again!). More recently, in the now fa-
mous Chester vs Afshar case (2004) (Cass 2006) the sur-
geon was found guilty of failing to notify even a 1-2%
chance of paralysis even though the defendant did not have
to prove that they would have chosen not to have the surgery
if they were given that information. In the context of human-
machine interactions, it is hard to say then what the user
agreement will look like, and whether there will be such a
thing as consenting to being deceived, if only for the greater
good, and what the legal outcomes of this will be when the
interactions do not go as planned.
The Placebo Effect Indeed, the effectiveness of placebo
medicine, i.e. medicine prescribed while known to have no
clinical effect, in improving patient symptoms is a strong
argument in favor of deception in the practice of medicine.
However, ethics of placebo treatment suggest that their use
be limited to rare exceptions where (Hume 1907) (1) the
condition is known to have a high placebo response rate;
(2) the alternatives are ineffective and/or risky; and (3) the
patient has a strong need for some prescription. Further, the
effectiveness of placebo is contingent on the patients trust
on the doctor which is likely to erode as deceptive practices
become common knowledge (and consequently render the
placebo useless in the first place). Bok (Bok 1999) points to
this notion of “cumulative harm”.
Primum Non Nocere Perhaps the most remarkable nature
of the doctor-patient relationship is captured by the notion
of the recovery plot (Hak et al. 2000) as part of a show be-
ing orchestrated by the doctor, and the patient being only
complicit, while being cognizant of their specific roles in it,
with the expectation of restoration of autonomy (Thomasma
1994), i.e. the state of human equality, free from the original
symptoms or dependence on the doctor, at the end of the in-
teraction. This is to say that the doctor-patient relationship is
understood to be asymmetric and “enters into a calculus of
values wherein the respect for the right to truth of the patient
is weighed against impairing the restoration of autonomy by
the truth” (Swaminath 2008) where the autonomy of the pa-
tient has historically taken precedence over beneficence and
nonmalfeasance (Swaminath 2008).
In general, a human-machine relationship lacks this dy-
namic. So, while there are interesting lessons to be learned
from clinical interactions with regards to value of truth and
utility of outcomes, one should be carefully aware of the nu-
ances of a particular type of relationship and situate an in-
teraction in that context. Such considerations are also likely
to shift according to the stakes on a decision, for example,
lives lost in search and rescue scenarios. The doctor-patient
relationship, and the intriguing roles of deception in it, does
provide an invaluable starting point for conversation on the
topic of greater good in human-AI interactions.
Conclusions
In this paper, we investigated the idea of fabrication, falsi-
fication and obfuscation of information when working with
humans in the loop, and how such methods can be used by
an AI agent to achieve teaming performance that would oth-
erwise not be possible. This is increasingly likely to become
an issue in the design of autonomous agents as AI agents
become stronger and stronger in terms of computational and
information processing capabilities thus faring better that
their human counterparts in terms of cognitive load and sit-
uational awareness. We discussed how such behavior can
be manufactured using existing AI algorithms, and used re-
sponses from participants in a thought experiment to gauge
public perception on this topic.
The question of white lies and obfuscation or manipula-
tion of information for the greater good is, of course, not
unheard of in human-human interactions. A canonical ex-
ample, as we saw in the final discussion, is the doctor-patient
relationship where a doctor might have to withhold certain
information to ensure that the patient has the best chance
to recover, or might explain to the patient in different, and
maybe simpler terms, than she would to a peer. It is unclear
then how such behavior will be interpreted when attributed
to a machine. We saw in the final case study that expec-
tations and dynamics of a doctor-patient relation are very
well-defined and do not necessarily carry over to a teaming
setting. However, existing norms in doctor-patient relations
do provide useful guidance towards answering some of the
ethical questions raised by algorithms for greater good.
From the results of the survey presented in the paper, it
seems that the public is, at least at the abstract level of the
thought experiment, positive towards lying for the greater
good especially when those actions would not be determined
by their teammate, but is loath to suspend normative behav-
ior, robot or not, in the event that they would be caught in
that act unless the robot is the recipient of the misinforma-
tion! Further, most of the responses seem to be following
a bimodal distribution indicating that the participants either
felt strongly for or against this kind of behavior. It will be
interesting to see if raising the stakes (for example, lives
saved) of outcomes of these scenarios can contribute to a
shift in perceived ethical consequences of such behavior, as
seen in doctor-patient relationships. Another area that has
seen evidences of AI being been used effectively to nudge
human behavior is behavioral economics (Camerer 2017)
which also raises similar interesting ethical dilemmas, and
can be an interesting domain for further investigation.
Finally, I note that all the use cases covered in the pa-
per are, in fact, borne directly out of technologies or al-
gorithms that I have developed (Chakraborti et al. 2015;
Chakraborti et al. 2017b), albeit with slight modifications.
as a student researcher over the last couple of years. Even
though these algorithms were conceived with the best of in-
tentions, such as to enable AI systems to explain their deci-
sions or to increase effectiveness of collaborations with the
humans in the loop, I would be remiss not to consider their
ethical implications when used differently. In these exciting
and uncertain times for the field of AI, it is thus imperative
that researchers are cognizant of their scientific responsibil-
ity. I would like to conclude then by reiterating the impor-
tance of self-reflection in the principled design of AI algo-
rithms whose deployment can have real-life consequences,
intended or otherwise, on the future of the field, but also,
with the inquisitive mind of a young researcher, marvel at
the widening scope of interactions with an artificial agent
into newer uncharted territories that may be otherwise con-
sidered to be unethical.
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